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Proposition 209:The Califbmk electorate passed a conistitiiti^nal amettdmmtby
 
initiative,bya 54-46%vote onNovember5,1996. Itisnow Article I, Section 31 ofthe
 
California Constitution. Koposition 209and''Yeson 209"can^ai^were projectsof
 
Califomians Against Discriniination and Preferences(GADAP). CADAPwas also an
 
intervener intherecehtly concluded litigation overthe constitutionality ofrneasure
 
(CoalitionforEconomicEqmty v.Pete Wilson etal).
 
This&cialchaUehgeto Article I,Section 31 ofthe Califomi^ State Constitution
 
failed. QnNovendier 3,1997,theU.S. Supreme Court denied certiorariin the case,
 
letting stand the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court ofi^peals decision ofApril1997which
 
stronglyupholdsthe constitutionality oftile measure.
 
The economic affectstothe small minority orwonm owned jiusinesses are
 
explored. The affect Proposition 209hason education dueto the California Constitution
 
changeisreviewed. The affectProposition 209hason affumative aptionin CaUfomia is
 
assessed.
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CHAPTERONE .
 
Thebic^tioii
 
The California electoratepassed a constitutionalamendmentbyinitiative,bya 54­
46%yOte on November5,1996 which became.Article I, Section pi ofthe Cahfomia
 
Constitution. Thisinitiative wasasthe result ofProposition 209. Proposition 209 and
 
the"Yeson 209"can:]paign were projectsofCalifomians A,gainst Discrimination and
 
Prefer^ces(CADAP). CADAPwas also apintervenorin the recently concluded
 
litigation overthe constitutionaHty ofthe meaisure(Coa//WdK^r£co«pwicJ^Mf^ Pete
 
Wilson etal.). (5-1)
 
Theinitial challengeto Article I, Section 31 ofthe Califomia State Constitution
 
faded. On November3,1997,the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorariin the case,let
 
stand the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court ofAppeals decision ofApril 1997which stron^y
 
upholdsthe constitutionality ofthe measure. CADAPwascreated in August1994bythe
 
California CivilRights Mtiatrves(CCRI),co-authors Glynn Custred,ThomasWood,and
 
LarryAmn. Thekey operative provisions ofthis measure States: "The state shallnOt
 
discriminate against.Or grant preferentialtreatmentto anyindividual or group onthe basis
 
ofrace,sex,color,ethnicity,or national origin in thd Operation ofpublic enp)loyment,
 
public education,or public contracting,"(6-1)
 
White votersfiieled the 54-46%victoryforthe constitutional amendmeptending
 
race and gender based anti-discrimination projgramsin state, county^ and city hiring,
 
contracting,and schooladmissions. Thevote rode a de^racial divide,accordingto an
 
Examiner/Voter NewsService exit poll. Whitesvoted forProposition 209,blacks and
 
Latinosvoted against,Mdiile Asian American voterswere^lit(4-1). Only San Francisco
 
and six other counties;Akmeda,Marin,San Mateo,Santa Clara, jSanta Cruzand Los
 
Angelesvoted against the proposition(2-2).
 
When it wentinto efifect at 12:01 a.m.,August28,1997,a cofihtion ofcivilrights 
attorneys planned to file atleast onefederalcourtlawsuit challenging thelaw as 
unconstitutional. The American CivilLiberties Union(ACLU),the Lawyers'Committee, 
the California LaborFederation,wd others planned a morning press conferencein San 
Francisco to talk aboutthe suit,which would seekto keep thelawfrom being enforced. 
(13-1) ■ 
Proponents,opponents,and San Francisco City AttorneyLouii^Renne predicted
 
an onslaught oflawsuits,both pro aid con. Some would atten^tto block thelaw;others
 
would atten^ttoforce cities, counties,schoolsystemsand collegesto con^ly with it.
 
Much ofthelegal wrangling revolved around the question ofwhat,precisely, constituted a
 
'preference".(13-1)
 
With itsburgeoning ethnic diversity, Califomia hasbecometl^e spawning ground
 
for voter-driven responsesto racial and economic insecurities and atrendsetterforthe
 
nation. Aswith Proposition 187,passage ofProposition2Q9is e]xpectedto spark an
 
explosion ofsimilar legislation acrossthe United States. Cities analogousto San
 
Francisco believe alltheir aflSrmative action programswerelegalunderProposition 209,
 
even their minority and women-owned busmesses.(13-2)
 
Cities were expected to be a partyto lawsuits overProposition 209one way or
 
another,whether their programs are sued bypeople who believethey discriminate or
 
whethertheyjoin tJie legal effortsto pvertum Rropositiori209. Proponentsofthe
 
measure,which poUshad consistently shownto he winners,wereJubiljant/ GovernorPete
 
Wilson,aleading supporter ofProposhion209 said the can^aign against it exaggerated
 
itsimpact.(13-2)
 
Wilson staited,"The civillights protectionsthat arefederalahjd statelaw not only
 
will stayin place,they will be vigorouidy enforced. We will moveas early as we canto
 
inplemeht it,butiamnot sure oflawsuitsfiled agaiust it,becpusepeople who are
 
opposed willseek to delaythe implementation aslong asthey can."
 
Opponentstried to putthe bestface ontheirloss. Feminist M^orityPresident md
 
Stop Proposition209 StalwartElhe SmealinLosAngeles stated,"theyfeltthey putup
 
one hellofa fi^ t." Their position was,that wasround one! They stated they were going
 
to fightthisin other states andin Congress, They assured that withouta huge infusion of
 
cash bythe Republican Party,theforcesofProposition209would pothave prevailed.
 
Theyblamed whatthey called deceptive wording ofthe proposal,which did notinclude
 
the words"jfflSrniative action."(13-2)
 
Paterson,aleader ofDefeatProposition 209,stated that,'Syhen he waswalked
 
into the voting booth that morning,andheread thelanguageto Proposition 209,he
 
couldn't believe anyone would be against it,it soundslike a combhijatiottofMalcolmX
 
and Martin Luther King,"
 
Theuse ofKing's wordsand iniage in a G^P TV adforProppsitioh 209sparked
 
outrage amongcMlrightsleaders and caused a nasty dust-up betweenthe party and the
 
Proposition 209can^aign,which had tried to sellthe proposition asa nonpartisan issue.
 
 It washeavily bankrolled bythe RepubUcanParty,which saw an opportunityto convert
 
affirmative action into the kind ofwedgeissue that hnmigration wasfor its candidatesin
 
1994.
 
Jennifer Nelson,spokeswomanforthe Proposition 209 can^aign,said the nation's
 
i . ■ 
eyes were on California's vote. "Withthe passage ofProposition 209,1think we've
 
created momentum nationallyto erase race and gender preferencesi^ other states and in
 
Congress,"she said, 'This sendsa strong messagetothe White House".(13-2)
 
Atthis point,a better wayto get an idea onthe objection to ^proposition 209can
 
best be understood bylooking atinformation provided bythe Feminist Majority
 
Movement,asprovided byEleanor SmeaL Thefollowing^re questions and answers
 
provided bythe Feminist Majority Movement. (9-2)
 
Questionsand AnswersaboutCalifornia's*^0"VoteOn Proposition 209
 
(1) Whatis affirmative action?
 
Affirmative action refersto programsthat seekto remedypast discrimination
 
against women,minorities,and othersbyincreasing the recruitment,promotion,retention
 
and on-the-job training opportunitiesin enq)loyment and byrernoving barriersto
 
admissionto educationalinstitutions. Because ofthelong history ofdiscrimination-based
 
sex and race,most affirmative action programshavebeen directed towardsinq)roving
 
en^loyment and education opportunitiesfor women and minorities.(8-1)
 
(2) Whatkind ofstrategies does aflSrmative actimiinclude?
 
Affirmative action strategiesinclude expanding the poolofjob or admission
 
application through recruitment strategies which reach outi^de ofusualor traditional
 
channels. Thishelpsto ensure that afairer representation ofqualified women and
 
minorities are availableto applyfor admissions orjobs.An exan:q>le,^e mailing
 
admissions apphcationstofemale high school seniors and posting ofjob noticesin places
 
where women and namorities are morelikelyto seethem Strategiesin en^loyment
 
include an increasein on-the-job training opportunitiesthatincrease occupational mobility
 
within the workplace. These strategies maybeinstituted bylaw pr coiut decree,or
 
voluntarilyto increasethe poolofqualified apphcantsand to diversifythe workplace.
 
(&-1)
 
(3) Doesn't afiBrmative action mean wetakeless qualified candidates? Isn't that wrongin
 
education and training?
 
Public aflSrmatwe action programs specifically do not allotythe acceptance of
 
unqualified applicants or workers. Thereis a difference,however,between affirmative
 
action instituted bylaw or court decree,following legal guidelinesthat we seein public
 
situations and those programsthat private businesses orinstitutions apply on a voluntary
 
basis.(8-1)
 
Wehavetraditionally accepted less qualified candidatesin education because it
 
"served a greater purpose"to do so. The prime exaicple isthe preferential acceptance of
 
children and relatives ofalumni—notwomen and minorities. These ate overwhehning
 
beneficiaries ofpreferentialtreatment at colleges and universities,greaterthan thenumber
 
ofminorities and women acceptedthrou^ afSrmative action programs. The slots
 
reserved for children ofalumni are call'legacy"seats. Thislegacy preferencein
 
admissionshas,in manycases,resulted inthe acceptance ofless qualified candidates over
 
better-qualified candidates. Thelegacy prefereuces are believed to especially benefit
 
whites,niales,andthe children ofwealthyahmmi(8-1)
 
There are many exanqjlesoftiiis preferentialtreatment. Children ofahmmiat
 
Harvard University,in 1991 werethreetimesmorelikelyto be accepted than other
 
prospective students. AtYale,children ofahmmiaretwo and halftimesmorelikelyto be
 
admitted, hi 1992,Dartmouth gave admission to57%ofitslegacy applicants and only
 
27%ofother students. The University ofPennsylvania accepted66%ofalumnus'
 
children. Twenty-five percent ofNotre Dame'sfreshmen classis saved forthe children of
 
alumni.
 
In unionsand certain occupations,preferentialtreatment hastraditionally been
 
given tothe relatives and fiiendsofenq)loyees and management,especially atthe entry
 
levelwhere unskilled enq)loyeesreceive onthejob training that qualifiesthemfor
 
advancement.(8-1)
 
(4) Whatwould Proposition209 do?
 
Because itisloosely written,no oneknowshowthe courts willinterpret
 
Proposition 209. There are afew areas,however,where we do know whatit islikelyto
 
do. According tothe non-partisan California Legislative Analyst,Propoi^on209would
 
"eliminate most aflBrmative action programsfor women and minorities ijrun by state or local
 
governments". ThismeansProposition209 will(8-2):
 
1. 	 End aflBrmative action outreach programsfor womjen and minoritiesin
 
governmentjobsand contracts;
 
2. 	 Prohibit courtsfrom ordering aflBrmative action reme<|ies evenin cases of
 
proven race and sex discrimiiiation;
 
3. In^erilworkmen'scenters and rape crisis centers on college canq)uses;
 
4. Scrap math and science programsfor girls;
 
5. Eliminate magnet schools designed to desegregate school districts.
 
(5) Ispreferentialtreatment wrong?
 
Preferentialtreatmentislegaljargon. Proposition 209 wouli|i outlaw any
 
aflBrmative action programincluding outreach,recruitment,training,hiring,contracting,
 
and other programswhich increase opportunitiesfor women apd minorities. It conhises
 
the curefor discrimination with discrimination itself A critical ai^ect ofProposition 209
 
isthat it only prohibits actionsbased on gender Or race.(9-3)
 
Other groups.Such as veterans,relatives,legacies,or people over65 years old are
 
still allowed to have preferentialtreatment and to seek othert5^esofpreferential
 
treatmentthroughlegal action. Theissue that preferentialtreatmentis undesirable seems
 
to onlyinterestthe supportersofProposition 209\^ilen it doesn't ^pplytothem(8-2)
 
Since Proposition209prohibitslegislation that benefits people based onlyon
 
gender and race and not based on age,relations,veteran status,or wherethey wentto
 
school,women and minoritieshaveto pass over a higher hurdle to havenewlegidation to
 
benefitthem ascon^aredto other groups. This preferentialtreatmentisimconstitutional.
 
(8-2)
 
(6) Whap about Clause"C"?
 
Clause"C" reads: "Nothinginthis section diallbeinterpreted as prohibiting bona
 
fide qualifications based on sex vvMch are reasonablynecessarytothe normaloperation of
 
public employment,public education,or public contracting." According to some
 
Califomialaw professors. Clause"C"creates a constitutionalri^tto incriminate against
 
women and girls.(4-1)
 
Thephrase,'Reasonablynecessary"in Clause"C"istjie criticalissue here. In
 
Califomia,the standard against sex discrimination statesthat it isillegalto discriminate
 
based on gender unlessit isnecessaryto achieve a"compelling purpose". Califomia has
 
the hi^est standard inthe nation because it isthe equivalenttothe EqualRights
 
Amendment. The standard for gender discrhnination issomewhatlowerin federallaw
 
because the EqualRi^tsAmendmentwasnever passed. The"reasonably necessary"
 
standard islower still. Proposition 209,Clause"C"will allow discriniination based on
 
genderifit is'Reasonablynecessarytothe normaloperation ofpublic enployment,public
 
education,or public contracthig." Thisis alower standard thatlegal ejj^erts sayis easyto
 
provein courttod willresult in womenlo^gthe equalopportunitythatthey currently
 
have achieved. Argumentsthat won'thold watertoday willbe acceptable and women will
 
not be hired or given opportunities because ofperceived or possible gender issues,such as
 
pregnancyinterfering with ni^twork.(8-2)
 
(7) Whyare we opposedto Proposition 209?
 
The so-called Califomia CivilRight's Initiative, which isneidjer civilnor right,is
 
reaUy a deceptive atten^tto constitutionalize gtoder discriipination tod slam shutthe
 
doorsofopportunitythat both women and people ofcolor havefought so hafdto open.
 
It places a hurdle to minorities and womenthatis hotplaced to others\^^o seek
 
legislation tp benefitthem(8-2)
 
(8) Whatdoesthe Supreme Courtrejection ofPropo^ion209 mean?
 
On November3,1997,the USSupreme Court rejected a broad challenge to
 
Califomia'sProposition 209, ITiis decision wasto rule against hearingthe appealfiled by
 
the American CivilLiberties Union claiming that govenimiPHit snrnetimeshas''an
 
aflBhmative dutyto eir^loyrace prefer^ces"to makeup for past or present disciirQihation
 
against nunorities. This setsthe stagefor fidlenforcement ofProposition 209. However,
 
sincePropositibn209doesnot changefederallawsand since manyofCalifomia'slocal
 
programsgetfederalftmding,many situations exist whereProposition 209can't be
 
implemented. However,individual situations where past or present discrimination based
 
on gender orracein public employment,education or contracting pan stdt be litigated.
 
These may\^dtheir wayup tothe SupremeCourtandpfowdea wayto challenge
 
Proposition 20^in the future.(8-2)
 
Following are argumentsinfevor ofProposition 209 b|ythe Americansfor
 
America.
 
The Rightlldni^ToDo
 
Ageneration ago,we did it ri^t Wepassed civilrightslawsto prohibit
 
discrimination. But spedalinterestshijackedthe civilrights movement. Mstead of
 
equality,governmentsimposed quotas,preferences,and set-asides. Proposition 209is
 
called the CaJifomia CivilRightsInitiative because it restatesthe historic CivilRightsAct
 
and proclaims sinply and clearly:"The state shallnot discriminate against. Or grant
 
preferentialtreatmentto,anyindividual or group,onthe basisofrace,sex,color,ethnicity
 
or national origininthe operation ofpublic enplOyment,public education,or public
 
contracting."(2-1)
 
"Reverse discrimination"based onrace or genderis plain wrong,andtwo wrongs
 
don't make a right. Today,students are being rejected frompublic universitiesbecause of
 
their race. Job apphcants areturned awaybecause their race doesnot meetsome"goal"
 
or"timetable." Contracts are awardedto high bidders becausethey are ofthe preferred
 
race. The government should not discriminate. It mustnot give ajot),a university
 
admission,or a contract based onrace or sex. t^vemment mustjudge all people equally,
 
without discrimination. Proposition209keepsin place allfederaland state protections
 
against discrimination.(2-1)
 
Government cannot work against discrimination ifgovernmentitselfdiscriminates.
 
Proposition 209 will stop the terrible programswhich are dividiag our people and tearing
 
us apart. People naturallyfeelresentment whentheless qualified arp preferred. We are
 
all Americans, It'stimeto bring ustogether under a single standard ofequaltreatment
 
underthe law. Discrimination is costlyin other ways. Government agenciesthroughout
 
California spend millionsofyourtax dollarsfor costly bureaucraciesto administer racial
 
and gender discriinination that masqueradesas"afiSrmative action." Theywaste much
 
more ofyour moneyawarding hi^-bid contracts and sweetheart dealsbased not onthe
 
low bid,but onimfrir set-asides and preferences. Thismoneycould be usedfor police
 
and fire protection,better education,and other programswhich would benefit everyone.
 
■(2-2) ^ 
The better choice, he^) only those who needhelp. We are individuals,not every 
whitepersonis advantaged, andnot evety "minority" is disadvantaged. Real affirmative 
action originally meansno discrimination and seeksto provide opportunityto all. That's
 
whyProposition209prohibits discriniination and preferences or allows preference
 
because ofrace or sex,to continue. The onlyhonest and effective wayto address
 
inequality ofopportunityisby making surethat all California children are provided with
 
the toolsto compete in our society,and theylet tiiem shcceed on afair, color-blind and
 
race blind basis. Let'snotperpetuate the myth,that niinorities and women cannot
 
conmete without specialpreferences. Let'sinstead moveforward byreturningtothe
 
hmdamentalsofour democracy;ie.,individual achievement,equal opportunity,and zero
 
tolerancefor discrimination against orfor anyindividual. Pete Wilson,Governor,State of
 
California,Ward Connerly,Chairmen California CivilRight?Initiative,and Pamela A.
 
Lewis,co-Chair,Califomia CivilRi^tsInitiative, signed this document.(2-2)
 
Rebuttal,"In Favor ofProposition 209"
 
A generation ago,RosaParkslaunchedthe civilrights movement which opened
 
the doorto equalopportunityfor women and minoritiesin this country. Parkis against
 
this deceptive initiative. Proposition 209highjacked civil rightslanguage and used legal
 
lingo to gut protections against discrimination. Proportion 209saysit eliminates quotas,
 
butin fact,the U.S. Supreme Court already decided twice,thatthey are illegal.
 
Proposition 209's purpose,isto eliminate aflBrmative action and equal opportunity
 
programsfor qualified women and minorities,including tutoring,outreach,and mentoring
 
programs.(3-1)
 
Proposition209changesthe California Constitution to permit state and local
 
governmentsto discriminate against women,byexcludingthemfi'omjob categories.
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Ward Connerlyhas already used hisinfluenceto get children ofhis rich and powerM
 
fiiendsinto the University ofCalifornia. Proposition 209reinforcesthp,"who youknow"
 
^stem whichfavorscroniesofthe powerfiilopposition. 'There are those vsdio say,we
 
can stop how,Americais a color-blind society. Butit isn't yet. There arethose who say
 
wehave a levelplajmg field,but we don't yet." Stated retired GeneralColin Powell,
 
(5/25/96).(3-1)
 
Background
 
Thefederal, state,and localgovernmentsrun manyprogramsintendedto increase
 
opportunitiesfor variousgroups-^including women and racial and eth^c minority groups.
 
These programs are commonly called "affirmative action"programs. For exan^le,state
 
law identifies specific goalsforthe participation ofwomen-owned^d minority-owned
 
cort^anieson workiavolved with state contracts. State departments are ej^ected,but
 
not required,to meetthese goals\Ndiich include that atleast 15%ofthe value ofcontract
 
work should be done bynhnority-owned conq)anies and at least5%should be done by
 
women-owned conq)^es.Thelaw requires departments,hoyvever,to reject bidsfi-om
 
cortqjaniesthat have not made sufficient"goodfaith efforts"to meetthese goals. (3-1)
 
Other exanq)les ofaflSrmative action programsmclude:
 
• Public college and university programs,such as scholarships,tutoring,and 
outreach that aretargeted toward minority or womenstudents. 
• Goalsand timetablesto mcouragethe hiring ofmembersof"under-represented" 
groupsfor state govemmeutjobs. 
• State and localprogramsrequired bythefederalgovernment asa condition of 
12­
  
 
 
receiviiig federalfimds(such asrequirementsfor mmority-owned business
 
participation in state highway construction projectsfunded in part with federal
 
money).
 
Proposal
 
This measure would eliminate state and localgovernment aflSrmative action
 
programsinthe areasofpubhc employment,public education,and public contracting to
 
the extentthese programsinvolve "preferentialtreatment"based on race,sex,color,
 
ethnicity, or national origin. The spedfic programs affected bythe measure,however,
 
would depend on such factors as;(1)coiut rulings on whattypes ofactmties are
 
considered "preferentialtreatment"and(2)whetherfederallawrequiresthe continuation
 
ofcertaip programs. (12-2)
 
The measure provides exceptionsto the ban on prqferenjiialtreatment,when
 
necessary,for anyofthefollowing reasons:
 
•	 Tokeep the state orlocalgovernments eligible to receive moneyfiromthefederal
 
government.
 
•	 To con^ly with a court orderinforce asofthe effective date pfthis measure(the
 
day after the election).
 
•	 To con^lywithfederallaw QitheThihed StatesG^stftution.
 
•	 To meet privacy and other consideratidns based on sexthat are reasonably
 
necessarytothe normaloperation ofpubhcerr^loyment,pubhc education,or
 
pubhc contracting.
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Fiscal Effect
 
Ifthis measureis approved bythe voters,it could affect a variety ofstate
 
and local programs. These programs are discussedin detail:
 
Public Employmentand Contracting
 
The measure would eliminate afBrmative action programsused to increase hiring
 
and promotion opportunitiesfor state orlocalgovernmentjobs,where sex,race,or
 
ethnicityis a preferentialfactorin hiring,training,promotion,orrecruitment decisions. In
 
addition,the measure would eliminate programsthat give preferencetp women-owned or
 
minority-owned con^anieson public contracts. Contracts affected bythe measure would
 
include contractsfor construction projects,purchasesofcort^uter equipment,and the
 
hiring ofconsultants. These prohibitions would not applytothose government agencies
 
that receive moneyimderfederalprogramsthatrequire such afBrmative action. (12-2)
 
The elimination ofthese programswould result in savingsto the state and local
 
governments. These savings would occurfortwo reasons. First,government agenciesno
 
longer would incur coststo administerthe programs. Second,the pricespmd onsome
 
government contractswould decrease. This would happen because l^idders on contracts
 
nolonger would need to show"goodfeith efforts"to use minority-owned or women-

owned subcontractors. Thus,state and localgovernmentswould save pioneyto the extent
 
they otherwise would have rejected alow bidder—becausethe bidder did not make a
 
"goodfeith effort"—and awarded the contractto a higher biddi». (12-2)
 
Based on available information,it is estimated thatthe measure would resultin
 
savingsin eroployment and contracting programsthat could totdtensofmillions of
 
U
 
dollars each year.(11-2)
 
Public Schoolsand Cominuiiity^CpUeges
 
The measure also could affectfimdhigfor public schools(Idndergaitenthrough
 
grade 12)and communitycollege programs. Forinstmice,the measure could eliminate,or
 
cause hmdamentalchangesto, desegregation programsrun byschool districts.
 
(It would not,however,affect cowrt-orvieret/desegregation programjs.)Exan^lesof
 
desegregation pendingthat could be affected bythe measureinclude the special hmding
 
given to: (1)"magnet"schools(in those cases\\iiererace or ethni(^ity are preferential
 
factorsinthe admission ofstudentstothe schools)and(2)designated "racially isolated
 
minority schools"that arelocated in areaswith high proportionsofpcialor ethnic
 
minorities. It is estimated thatup to $60 milhon ofstate and localfundsspent each year
 
on voluntary desegregation programsmaybe affected bythe measure.(12-2)
 
In addition,the measure would affect a variety ofpublic schooland community
 
college programs such as coimseling,tutoring,outreach,studet^tsfinancial aid,and
 
financial aid to selected school districtsin tiiose cases wherethe programsprovide
 
preferencestoindividuals or schoolsbased on race,sex,ethnicity,ornational origin.
 
Fundsspent onthese programstotalat least$15 million each year.(12-2)
 
Thus,the measure could affect up to$75 rbillion in^ate spendingin public schools
 
and conimunity colleges. The State Constitution requiresthe state to spend a certain
 
amount each year on public schoolsand community colleges. Asa rpsult,under most
 
situations,the Constitution would require thatfundswhich cannot be ^enton programs
 
because ofthis measureinstead would haveto be spentfof other public schoolsand
 
 commimity college programs. (12-3)
 
University ofCalifornia and California State University
 
The measure would affect admissions and other programs atthe state's public
 
universities. For exan^le,the CaUfomia State University(CSU)usesrace and ethnicity as
 
&ctorsin someofits admission decisions. Ifthisinitiative is passed bythe voters,it could
 
nolonger do so. In 1995,the Regentsofthe UniversityofCalifornia(UC)changed the
 
UC's admissions policies. Effectiveforthe 1997-98 academic year,UC eliminated all
 
consideration ofrace or ethnicity. Passage oftihis initiative bythe voters might require the
 
UCtoinq)lement its admission policies somewhat sooner.(12-3)
 
Both university systemsrun a variety ofassistance programsfpr students,fecidty,
 
and staff \\bich are targeted to individuals based on sex,race,or ethnicity. These include
 
programssuch as outreach,counseling,tutoring,and financial aid. Thetwo systems
 
spend over$50 million each year on programsthat probably would be affected by passage
 
ofthis measure.(12-3)
 
Summary
 
Asdescribed above,tWs measure could affect state and localprogramsthat
 
currently cost wellin excessof$125 million annually. The actualamopntofthis spending
 
that mightbe saved as a result ofthis measure could be considerably less,for various
 
reasons(12-4):
 
• The amount ofspending affected bythis measure could b^less depending on:
 
(1)court rulingsonvv^iat types ofactivities are considered,"preferential
 
treatment"and(2)whetherfederallaw requires continuation pfcertain programs.
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• In most cases,anyfiindsthat could notbe spentfor existing programsin public 
schools and community colleges would haveto be spent on o^erprogramsinthe 
schoolsand colleges. 
• hi addition,the amount effected asa result ofthis measureiwould belessifany 
existmg afBrmative action programswere declared unconstitutionalunderthe 
United States Constitution. For exanq)le,"five"state aflBrmatwe action programs 
are currentlythe subject ofalawsuit. Ifanyofthese programs arefound to be 
unlawfiil,tbeuthe state could no longer spend moneyon^em~regardlessof 
\\dietber this measureisin effect.(6-1) 
• Finally,someprogramswehave identified asbeing aff^^d mi^tbe changed to 
usefactors otherthan those prohibited bythe measure. For exan^le,ahi^school 
outreachprogram operated bythe UCorthe CSUthat currently uses afector such 
as ethnicityto target spending could be changed to targethi^schools withlow 
percentages ofUCor CSU applications,(12-4) 
Considering the pros and consto Proposition 209,and the effectthatthis change 
hasonthe Califomia Constitution,there is a need to take alook atthe constitutionality of
 
this proposition. Chaptertwo dealwith thistopic fi"omthe legalpointofview.
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 CHAPTERTWO
 
The Constitutionality ofPropoatioii209
 
entrenched discrinunation ensures a£5nnatiye action a place as one ofthe most
 
contentiousissues ofthe late twentieth century, exponentsofafiSrmative action argue
 
thatthe Equalftotection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendmentispremised on an
 
individual's rightnotto be subjectto anygoyemmehtalrace-based classification.
 
Proponentsrespond thatAegoalofequality willbe a hollow pledge ut^essrace-conscious
 
eflforts can be used to remedy discrimination. Federallaw standssomewhere between
 
these extremes. It allowslawmakerstotake race and genderinto accountin narrow
 
instancesto remedyidentified discrmunation. Federalcourts and the EqualEn^loyment
 
Opportunity Commission(EEGC)havetraditionally defined the lin^its on public sector
 
aflSrmative action,and most stateshave not established substantially different standards
 
under statelaw. However,in November 1996,Califotnia voters adopted Proposition 209
 
which amended the state constitutionto bar public entitiesfrom granting preferential
 
treatment onthe basis ofrace,sex,color,ethnicity,or nationalorigin^ (7-2081)
 
BeforePropoi^ion 209 wasputtothe voters,its opponentsfiled an unsuccessfid
 
lawsuit claiming thatthe initiative cloaked a categoricalban on afiirmative action in
 
traditional anti-discriminationImiguage. Although a Ninth Circuit Court panellater held
 
that Proposition 209did notviolatethe equalprotection clause on itsface,that decision
 
failed to end the litigation surrounding Proposition 209,andmanyissuesremain unsettled.
 
Severalcity and countygovernmentshaveindicated thatthey willterminate all afBrmative
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action programsbecausethey believe eitherthatthey are alreadyin compliance with
 
Proposition 209,orthat Proposition 209 maybeunconstitutionalas applied in certain
 
situations. Attiie sametimeProposition209maybe unconstitutionalas applied in certain
 
situations. Uncertainty overthe scope ofProposition 209'sprohibition mayhaveled some
 
governmentsto suspend programsthatthe amendment doesnot actually ban.
 
Just as Califomia's GovernorPete Wilson hasvowed th^t he willvigorously
 
enforcethe ban,civilri^tsgrOupsare exaraining waysJo blunt itsintact.Because
 
Galifomia encon^asses500 dties,58 counties,and 5,000 specialdistricts,the battle over
 
in^lementing Proposition 209islikelyto beexteniSive. Asmanycommentatorsnote,the
 
m:q)ortance ofthis battle sweepsbeyond Cahfomia politic^ becausethe adoption of
 
Proposition 209has encouraged other statesto reconsider their afiBrmative action
 
programs. Thispaper examinessome argumentsthat mightbe raised tp challenge and limit
 
Proposition 209 and similarfuturelaws. Thefollowing asks,first, whether a state
 
government mayprevent courtsfrom using race conscious measures^o remedyviolations
 
offederallaw. Then it examines whethera state hasthe authorityto limit voluntary af­
jBrmative action available under Title Vnto en^lOyers with workforces segregated byrace
 
orgender. (7-2082)
 
After providing the background to thelegal skirmishes surrc^unding Proposition
 
209,subsection titled,'Interpreting Proposition 209"exploressome possible
 
interpretationsofProposition 209to assessitsscope. Subsection,'fThe Ninth Circuit's
 
Ruhng onProposition 209",e?^lainsthe Ninth Circmt Court'sruhng'm Coalitionfor
 
EconomicEquity v. Wilson. Subsection,"TheImpact ofPropoi^ion 209on Court­
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Ordered and Approved Affirmative Action"arguesthata state maynotforbid courtsthat
 
hearfederal causes ofaction from ordering or approviug in consent fiecrees,race or
 
gender consciousrehefin orderto eradicatethe effects ofidentified discrimination when
 
such reliefisnecessaryto remedy constitutionalorfederal statutory violations. In such
 
instances,the Supremacy Clause requires state courtstofollow federallaw.
 
Subsection,"Voluntary Affirmative Action Underthe Constitution and Title VU",argues
 
that Proposition209 cannot be apphedto prohibit government enq)loyersfromusing
 
affirmative action whenthere is a"strong basisin evidence"thatthqy maybe subjectto
 
underlying Title VU. The conclusion summarizesthe permissible s^ope ofProposition
 
209'sprohibition on affirmative actionin li]^t ofconflicts with the FederalConstitution
 
and Title Vn.(7-2083)
 
Interpreting Proposition 209
 
In orderto assessthe circmnstancesin which race or gender consciousremedies
 
mightbe allowed,notwithstanding Proposition 209,one mustfirst have a generalidea of
 
the initiative's scope.Proposition 209'sfirst clauses,"the state shallnot discriminate
 
against"™ singlyrestates existing anti-discrinnnationlaw and hasno]t been challenged in
 
court. Theremainder ofthe prohibition doesnot require a categoricalban on affirmative
 
action;its plain language prohibits onlythe more limited categoryof'preferential
 
treatment."(7-2083)
 
AfiSrmative action is a broad termthatincludespreferenpes,byt also encon^asses
 
targeted training and recruiting effortsthatfall short ofan expfidt preferencein selection
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basedonrace or gender. '^Preference"is a narrowerterm,used only whena person would
 
nothave received a benefit exceptfor his/her race or gender. Set ^sides,quotas,and
 
selection processesin which race is used asa"plus"that provides a decisive advantage
 
would qqalify aspreferences.
 
Someusesofrace and gender,however,maynot constitute preferences per se.
 
Forinstance,onecould regard a notification programthattm'getsunderrepresented races
 
asan aUocation ofpubhcfimdsbai^d on race,andfiiusa'preference."However,
 
assuming thatinformation abouta government programispublicly available and fiiat
 
obtaining information doesnoten^e one's acceptanceinto file program,no realbenefit
 
hasbeen distributed or denied onfiie basis ofrace. Notification pro;^anis seekto equafi^
 
information amongindmdualsbyfocusing onthose^oupsthat are pot receiving
 
information ayailableto others npn mmority or male yfio doesnotbenefit firomthe
 
targeted recrmting doeshot si^erifthere were other ayenueathfou^yvhich the
 
mfofmation wasaccessibleto him(7-2084)
 
The best waytoimderstandthe distinction between afiBrmatiye action and
 
preferencesisfiiat in orderfor a personto receive a preference, miother person,whether
 
identifiable or not,must suffer discrimination. For exann)le,the use yfbusingto achieve
 
schoolintegration is nota preference. godofbusingisto provide children with an
 
education in anintegrated setting,a benefitthat accruesto aUraces. Further,busing does
 
not deny any child the opportunityto goto schooland the burden ofbeing sentto a
 
different schoolis generallyhomeby children ofallraces. (7-2084)
 
In interpreting Proposition 209,the California SupremeCourt should acknowledge
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 the difference between preferences and affirmative action. When it interprets a voter
 
initiative,the courtlooksfirsttothe initiative's plain language. Althou^its drafl:ers could
 
have chosento use aflBrmative action.Proposition 209speaks onlyof"preferences."
 
Indeed,Proposition 209proponentswantthe courtto prevent opponmtsfi"om changing
 
the initiative'slanguage which demonstratesthat both sidesrecognized the significance of
 
Proposition 209'sterminology. Second,the Califomia Supreme Courtlooksto voter
 
intent. When an initiative'slanguageis ambiguous,Califomia courtsmayturn to extrinsic
 
materialsto deducetheintent ofvoters,such asthe official ballot pan^hlet distributed to
 
all registered voters. The Proposition 209ballot pan^hletincludedtwolengthypolemics
 
articulating the opposing sidesoftheissue. The argumentsin &vorofProposition 209,
 
which were signed by Governor Wilson and Califomia Attomey GeneralDanielLundren,
 
asserted thatProposition 209bans discrimination and preferentialtreatment"period"smd
 
stressed that programs designed to ensure that allpersonsregardless ofrace or gender are
 
informed ofopportunities ... wfll continue asbefore. Further,propqnents argued,
 
afiSrmative action programsthat don't discriminate or grant preferentialtreatment wUlbe
 
unchanged. Thus,the proponentsofProposition 209recognized a di^ction between
 
aflBrmative action and preferences. Although Proposition 209opponentssuggested in the
 
pamphletthatProposition 209would ban aU aflBrmative action,the proponent'sin
 
terpretation,lAhich wasendorsed bythe Govemor and Attomey Gaieral,wasprobably
 
perceived asthe more authoritative interpretation. (7-2085)
 
In addition,voter exit polls, willofthe voter'sintent,indicate that Califomia
 
voters did notintendto eradicate all aflBrtnatiye action. An exit poUr^ealedthat27%of
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those wiio voted for Proposition209 stated thatthey supported aflBrmative action. At
 
least these voters did notthink they were banning all aflSrmative ^ction byvoting for
 
proposition 209. Another polltaken shortly before the election revealed that,"large
 
majoritiesofCalifomians said,theyfevored atleast some ofthe equal opportunity efforts
 
that fallunderthe afSrmative action label." Although a majorityofthose polled opposed
 
"preferences",approximately75%fiivored minority recruiting.(7-2P85)
 
Moreover,a California appellate courthas determined that afBrmative action and
 
preferences are dififerent, and that onlythe latter are banned byProppsition. 209. In
 
refiising to changethe wording ofProposition209priortothe November 1996vote,the
 
courtinLun^env.Superior Courtdeclared that"any statementtothe affect that
 
proposition209repeals afBrmative action programswould be overinclusive and hence,
 
false and misleading." Forinstance,the court noted,afBrmative action wouldinclude
 
outreach programs. Therefore,a broad interpretation that read Proposition209to ban all
 
formsofafBrmative action would conflict with the plahilanguage ofthe initiative as well
 
asvoterintent. The California Supreme Court should adoptthe approachtaken in
 
Lungren and limit Proposition 209to prohibit only programsrequiring preferences. (7­
2086)
 
The Ninth CircuitCourtRuUng on Proposition 209
 
Soon after voters passed Proposition 209,a coalition ofcivilrights groupsfiled a
 
§1983 action to enjoin Governor Wilson fi^ om enforcing it. ChiefJudge Thelton E.
 
Henderson granted both atenq)oraryrestraining order and a preliminaryinjunction
 
because he determined thatthe plaintiSs were likelyto prevail on their claimsthat
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Proposition 209violated the EqualProtection Clause and waspreen^ted by Title Vn.
 
However,in April 1997,the Ninth Circuit Courtruled in CoalitionforEconomic
 
Equity v. Wilson that Proposition 209 doesnotviolatetheEqualProtection Clause on its
 
face and isnotpreempted by Title VTI. In a caustic opinion,the paqellamented that a
 
"system which permitsonejudgeto block with the stroke ofa pen what4,736,180 state
 
residentsvoted to enact aslaw teststhe integrity ofour constitutional democracy." The
 
court stated thatthe plaintiSs&iled to present a viable equalprotection challenge based
 
on"conventional"equalprotection precedentsbecauseProposition 2Q9,vriiich prohibits
 
racial classifications, did notits selfcreate a racial classification. Second,the courtturned
 
to whatit deemed "political structure"analysis,the purportedly unconventional approach
 
to equalprotection elucidated bythe Supreme Courtin Hunter v.Erickson 53and
 
Washington v. Seattle SchoolDistrictNo.1.54. HunterandSeattle suggested that states
 
cannotpasslawspreventing minorities fi"om seeking anti-discrimination protections,such
 
asbusiness programs,through the same political structure as all other citizens. The Niath
 
Circuit Courtinq)lied thatHunterandSeattle wereirreconcilable with morerecent
 
Supreme Court cases stating thatthe rightto equalprotectioninheresin iudividualsrather
 
than groups. (7-2086)
 
The Ninth Circuit Courtreasoned that Proposition209wasdistinguishable firom
 
the measures atissuein Hunterand because it treats allissuesin a neutral-fadiion
 
ratherthan singling outissuesthat affect a particular race or gender. Further,the panel
 
argued,thatthe Constitution permitsthe rare race-based or gender-based preference
 
hardlyinq)hesthatthe state cannot banthem alltogether. Thus,the court concluded that
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the EqualProtection Clause doesnot require afiSrmative action. The SupremeCourt
 
declined to hearthe appealfromthe Ninth Circuit Court decisidth-(7-2085)
 
TheImpactofProposition 209On Court-Orderediand Approved Affirmative
 
Action
 
Court-Ordered AfiBrmatrve Action: Akey question posed byProposition 209is
 
whether statelaw can stand as a barrier tothein^lementation ofrace and gender
 
consciousremediesthat are designed to address constitutional or {Statutory violations.
 
State andlocalgovernmentsinclement aflSrmative actionin three ways. First,in rare
 
situations,a court that identifies a violation ofthe Constitution orfederallaw hasthe
 
authorityto order race or gender-based measures asaremedy. Second,courts may
 
approve privately negotiated consent decreesto remedypast discritnination. Third,and
 
most commonly,aflBrmatrve action isircq)lemented byvoluntary government action.
 
The Supreme Court approved a court-ordered preference asa remedyfor a
 
constitutionalviolation in UnitedStates v,Paradise. Paradise involved egregious
 
resistanceto integration bythe Alabama Department ofPublic Safety. The Supreme
 
Court concluded thatthere wasa"profound need and a firmjustification"forthe court­
in^osed quota and that"the government unquestionablyhad a conq)elling interest m
 
remedying past and present discrimination bya state actor." The court wassatisfied that
 
the district court,which had att6iiq)ted other stmctionsto no avail,reasonably concluded
 
thatthe quota wasnecessaryto eradicate discriminations. Therefore,theremedy survived
 
strict scrutiny and did notviolatethe EqualProtection Clause. (7-2088)
 
In casessuch asParoc/we,the court has established that courts possessthe
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equitable powernecessaryto usefederalrights. The courthasgone so&r asto authorLze
 
a courtto order a school district to raise taxesto fimda desegregation plan.Remediesfor
 
constitutionalviolations are essentialboth to conq)aisate victims and to ensure that
 
governrnent remains wi^inthe boundsofdielaw. Consequently,when'Tt hasbeenfound
 
that a particularremedyis required,the state cannot hinderthe processby preventing a
 
localgovermnentfoominq)lenienting that remedy;''(7-2098)
 
Therefore,a criticalissue isvhether courts wiflinterpretProposition 209to
 
restrict the remediesthey Can order. Proposition 209 declaresthatth^ state shallinclude,
 
butnotnecessarily belimited to,tile state itself any city,county,city and county,public
 
university system,inchiding the University pf"Califorma,cpnimiuuty college district,
 
school district, q>ecial district,or any other political subdivision or goverhmental
 
instrumentality ofor within the state. Thislanguage seerhsto encon^ass state and local
 
courts.(7-2098)
 
In addition,section 3-1(d)ofthe California Constitution providesthat'hothing in
 
this section shallbeinterpreted asinvalidating any court order or consent decree which is
 
in force asofthe effective date ofthis section." This provision n^yinq)lythat proposition
 
209wasintended to affect prospective court orders and consent decrees. In any event,
 
even ifstate courts are not covered as governmentinstrumentalities,a govemmmtthat
 
granted preferentialtreatrnent pursuantto a court order or a consent decree would seem
 
to bp covered.(7-2089)
 
Atleast one commentator suggeststhat Proposition209may affect reliefordered
 
byfederal courts. However,the canon ofconstitutional avoidance,vshich requiresthat
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statutes bemteipreted to avoid constitutional conflicts,justifiesinterpreting Proposition
 
209to exclude remedies ordered byfederalcourts^(7-2090)
 
Ifa courtinterpreted Proposition209as atten^tingto obstructfederal court
 
remedies.Proposition 209would be unconstitutionalas applied North CarolinaState
 
BoardofEducation V.Swann established that states camnot block court-ordered remedies
 
for constitutionalviolations. North Carolma passed an anti-businglawto prohibit courts
 
from assigning studentsto particular schoolsonthe basis ofrace. Aunanimous Supreme
 
Court brushed the statute aside,declaring that state policy must^e\yaywhenit operates
 
to hinder vindication offederalconstitutionalguarantees. Reaching its result, despitethe
 
statute's purportedfyneutralban on ah race-based assagnments,the cpurtnoted thatthe
 
statute"would deprive school authorities ofdie onetoolabsolutely essentialto fidfillment
 
oftheir constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dualschool sysjtems." (7-2090)
 
Similarly,Proposition 209,ifapplied tofederal courts,would threatento hanqier
 
the ability oflocal authoritiesto effectivelyremedy constitutionalviolations, Adnnttedly,
 
the North Carolina Actwasa direct attenqjtto defythe Supreme Court's desegregation
 
rulingsin a waythat Proposition 209isnot. Nevertheless,the Supreme Court's analysis
 
ofthe Anti-^Busing Act demonstratesthatthefocusofthe analysis should bethe effect of
 
the legislation on effortsto remedy discrunination,rather than an hijquiryinto invidious
 
intentbythe legidatures. Underthis rationale,any attemptto applyProposition 209to
 
obstructfederalcourt remedies would beunconstitutional. (7-2091)
 
State courts are also bound bythe obligationto rbmedy constitutionalviolations,
 
even whenthe remedies conflict with statelaw. TheSupreme Cou(thasheld that state
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courts musthearfederal claimsin casesfor which Congressprovides concurrent
 
jurisdiction. State courts generally mayapplyneutral state procedtnalrulesto federal
 
claims aslong asthey would applythe rulesto emalogoUs state claitns. However,in
 
Felder v. Casey,the Court struck downthe application ofa state proceduralrule that
 
would have denied a remedyfor a constitutionalviolation. Commentatorshave
 
understood Felderto suggestthat rulesthat hi^ose a "substantive condition"on,and
 
thereby abridgefederalri^ts areinvahd. Underfederallaw,courtscan order preferential
 
reliefonly when itistruly necessary. The apphcmion ofProposition 209to afederalclaim
 
would eviscerate necessaryrehefandthus uhpose a substantive condition onfederal
 
rights.(7-2091)
 
In a case,notinvolving preferentialrehe:^ the Supreme Court held that a district
 
court must determine thatthe rehefis"necessary"or"essential"ifthatrehefwould order
 
action that would violate state law. However,this generalrequirementimposesno
 
additionalhurdlefora court considering whetherto require race-consciousrehef Strict
 
scrutiny,narrowlytailored requirements,already demandsa&dingthatthe race
 
consciousrehefisnecessaryin h^tofrace-neutral alternatives. (7^2091)
 
ConsentDecrees: Consent decrees are hj^ridsthat possess"attributes both of
 
contracts and ofjudicial decrees." Local93,InternationalAssociatioriofFirefighters
 
V. CityofCleveland,the court ahgncd consent decrees ordering preferentialrehefwiththe
 
lenient standard apphcableto voluntary afiBrmative action instead ofthat apphcableto
 
court ordered rehefunderTitle Vn. Thus,the SupremeCourt estal^hdied those district
 
courts hearing Title Vn casesmay approve consent decreesthat provide broader rehef
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 than the district court could independently order.(7-2091)
 
Anin:q)ortant issue thatthe court hasnot addressed is whether a court approving a
 
consent decree tiiat violatesProposition209mustfind an actualconstitutional or statutory
 
violation before approving the decree. In Firefighters, the court difi not require such a
 
finding. Some circuit courts,however,relying onMissouri v. Jenkins,have held that a
 
finding ofan actualviolation is necessary before a court approvesa decree authorizing the
 
partiesto disregard statelaw. However,Jenkins Tmoh/oA.taxation,a fimction historically
 
reserved tothe states. Similarly,circuit court casesinq)osing such a requirementbefore a
 
court mayapprove a consent decree,haveinvolved proposed agreementsthat required the
 
partiesto diverge fi^ omlong-standinglawsin areasin vriiich stateshaye heightened
 
interestsin local control. Such reliefintrudeson tiie sovereignty oflocalgovernmentsby
 
restricting their authorityto manage their own afi^s. Yetthe principlesoffederalism
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underlying those decisions do not applyto Proposition 209. Approving a consent decree
 
thatincorporatespreferencestiiat are authorized underfederallaw createsno comparable
 
intrusion on state sovereignty. Ifanything.Proposition 209'snovel atten:q)tsto ban
 
practices authorized byfederallaw approachesanintrurion onfederal authority.
 
Moreover,the Ninth Circuit Court,whoselaw govemsCahfomia eroployers,has
 
suggested that courtsneed notfind an actualviolation:. (7-2092)
 
In sum.Proposition 209doesnot create a greater obstacleto court ordered or
 
approved preferencesthan does strict scrutiny. Because ofthe Supremacy Clause,state
 
courts bear an equalobligation to provide federally authorized remedies,whetherthose
 
remedies arise fi-om voluntary decrees or designed Ipy a court.(7-2093)
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Voluntary Affirmative Action Under The Constitution and Title VH
 
Affirmative action plansinstituted by public sector en^loyers must satisfy boththe
 
Constitution and Title Vn. In CityofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co.m&Adarand
 
Constructors,Inc. v.Perm,the Supreme Court established that all st^te andfederal
 
government racial classifications are subjectto strict scrutiny. However,when assessing
 
whether aflBrmative action plansviolate Title Vn,the court has adojpted a morelenient
 
"manifestimbalance"standard,which doesnot explicitly requirea finding ofintentional
 
discrimination. In UnitedSteelworkers v. Weber,the court signaled its willingnessto
 
permit affirmative action under Title VHto eliminate manifest racialimbalancesin
 
traditionaUy segregatedjob categories. The court concluded that i^ was"clearthat
 
[interpretive Title VHto bar afiSrmative action]would bring about an end corr^letely at
 
variance with the purpose ofthe statute." Ahhou^the court restricted itsinquiryto what
 
action Title VHforbids,the Weber majority suggested that Congressintended affirmative
 
action to be an available toolto condensatefor past discrimination. (7-2093)
 
In 1987,ih&coxat'mJohnson v. Transportation AgencyXQS&tmoA Weber's
 
holding aswellasthe standard that it setforth. Although thetransportation agency was
 
subjectto the EqualProtection Clause,the court addressed onlythe Title VHissue.
 
Justice Brennan,writing forthe Johnson majority,endhasized that an f'employer adopting
 
a plan need not pointto itsown prior discriminatory practicesnor even to evidence of
 
arguable violation on its part."(7-2093)
 
In contrasttoJohnson, Wygantv. JacksonBoardofEducation addressed onlythe
 
equalprotection standard for public endloyer affirmative action. The courtheld that
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before a public en^loyer iirq)lemeuts an aflSrmative action plan,the en^loyer musthave
 
"convincing evidence"that it has discriminated in the past. A public etnployer can
 
independently assessthe need to remedy discrimination and a violation need notbe
 
adjudicated priorto the hx^lementation ofan afBrmative action plan. Ifnon-minority
 
eroployees challenge sucha program,the district court must determine whetherthere is a
 
"strong basisin evidence"that a remedialplan is warranted. Further,the program mustbe
 
narrowlytailored,which requiresthe governmentto considerthe efficacy ofrace-neutral
 
altematives. (7-2094)
 
Justice O'Connor concurred in Wygantto enq)hasize thatthq court's opinion left
 
significant latitude for public en^loyersto use affirmative action to remedy past
 
discrimination. Justice O'Connornoted that neither the Constitutipn nor Title VU
 
requiresrace consciousremediesto"be accompanied bycontenq)oraneousfindings of
 
actual discrimination aslong asthe public actor hasa firm basisfor believing that remedial
 
action isrequired,such asa statisticalimbalance sufficientto support a prima facie case of
 
discrimination."(7-2094)
 
Accordingto the court,"Congressintended voluntary coroplianceto bethe
 
preferred meansofachieving the objectivesofTitle VU." Moreover,in both Johnson and
 
Wygant,Justice O'Connor stressed,"the Court's and Congress",consistent enq)hasison
 
the value ofvoluntary effortsto fiutherthe anti-discrimination purposesofTitle VU.
 
Because Congressintended enq)loyersto be ableto complyvolimtarily with Title
 
VU,Proposition 209mustbe preenn)ted when it prevents ehq)loyersfi-om achieving
 
compliance. However,Proposition 209would be preenpted only when employersneed
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to use preferencesto avoid liability. Enq)loyerswho have virtually exclusively white or
 
male workersin traditionally segregated positions can expectto be sued for usingjob
 
criteria that disproportionatelyimpact a protected class. In some situations,en^loyers
 
who arguably violate Title W mayavoid lawsuits merelybyrevising selection criteria that
 
havethe effect ofexcluding minorities or women. Additionally,employers mayinstitute
 
race-conscious measuresthatfeU short ofa preference,such as minqrity notification. In
 
manyinstances,however,an employer'snotoriety asa discrirninatory,may deter under
 
represented classesfrom applying,even after the employer changesits hiring criteria.
 
Thus,atemporary preferentialpohcy maybethe most effective,and indeed an essential
 
meansofconcplying with Title Vn. The courtrecognized thisfact in bothParadise and
 
Local28,SheetMetal Workers'InternationalAssociation v.EEOC,in which it upheldthe
 
use ofa race conscioushiring goalbecause,in some cases, aflBrmatiye action maybe
 
necessaryin orderto effectively enforce Title Vn. Commentatorsnotethat"employers
 
faced with a potential disparateinpact claim(ifthey could notshow business necessity)
 
would be sure to protectthemselves onlyifthey engagedin someform ofafiSrmative ac
 
tion;even scrupuloudy race-neutralemployment practices would not alwaysbe enough."
 
In fact. Justice Blackmim stated in his Weber concurrencethat a prohibition on aflSrmative
 
action would create irreconcilable tension with Title VITs disparate inpactframework.(7­
2096)
 
Althoughthe Supreme Court'sinterpretations ofTitle\TIand tiieEEGC
 
guidelines provided Califomia employersthe breathingroomto conaderrace wfren
 
necessaryto remedytheir own discrimination. Proposition 209threatensto eliminate this
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breathingroomby exposing en^loyersto lawsuitsfor violating the state constitution.
 
These countervailingforcestake the risk ofdisparateintact claimsif^ enq)loyer's
 
workforce remains conspicuously devoid ofminorities or women. In exposureto"reverse
 
discrimination"thelaw claims,when preferencesto enactremedy discriminates,placing
 
some employerson a high tightrope without a net beneaththem UnlessProposition 209
 
is preen:q)ted in these situations,it would create a sharp conflict betwem statelaw andthe
 
Constitution. AsJustice O'Connor argued in Wygani,public en^loyerswho have a
 
constitutional dutyto take afiSrmative stepsto eliminatethe continuing effects of
 
discrimination,should not be rendered less capable oferadicating discrimination than their
 
private sector counterpartswhohaveno corresponding duty. Nonetheless,in Coalition
 
forEconomicElquity v. Wilson,the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that Title VU doesnot
 
preemptProposition 209. In determining whether Statelaw conflicts Ayith federalpolicy,a
 
court must ask vriiether statelaw"stands as an obstacle tothe accomplishment and
 
execution ofthe fiiU purpose and objectivesofCongress." The generaf preemption clause
 
governing Title Vn statesthatno"provision ofthis Act shallbe construed asinvalidating
 
anyprovision ofstatelawimless such provision isinconsistent with anyofthe purposesof
 
this Act." The district courtin CoalitionforEconomicEquity v. Wilson concluded that
 
the plaintifife werelikelyto prevailon their Title Vn preemption claim based primarily on
 
theEEOCguidelines and,to alesser extent,onthe Supreme Court cases construing Title
 
VITspurposes. The Ninth Circuit Court rejected the district court's holding,citing Title
 
VITsprovision,thatnothing in this sub-chapter shallbeinterpretedto require any[entity]
 
to grant preferentialtreatmentto anyindividualorto anygroup because ofrace,
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color,religion,sex,or national origin,thatlanguagethe court conteuded,settled the
 
matter definitively. (7-2097)
 
However,in reaching its conclusion that Title Vnand Prpposition 209are
 
"entirely consistent,"the Ninth Circuit Court panel misconstrued the central question.
 
The question wasnot whether Title Vnrequires afiSrmative action,hecause Title VITs
 
plain language demonstratesthat it doesnot. Rather,the properinquiryis whether Title
 
vnrequiresthat enq)loyershave discretion to use preferencesto compensateforthen-

past discrimination. The plainlanguage ofTitle Vn doesnot answer this question. By
 
raising a specious argument andthen easily dismissing it,the Ninth Circuit Court avoided
 
the onlyissue genuinelyin dispute. This evasion allowedthe Ninth Circuit Courtto
 
sidestep the Supreme Court cases construing Title VITspmposes,as wellastheEEOC
 
guidelines wfiich strongly support voluntary aflSrmative action. Thus,the court's cursory
 
preen:q)tion analysisfailed to grapple with the Supreme Court's en^hasisonthe
 
in:q)ortance ofvoluntary aflSrmative action eflfortsto achieve Title VITspmpose.
 
Proposition209shoxild notbe allowed tolock in the vestigesofpast discrimination by
 
disabling violatorsfirom conq)lying with the Constitution and Title VU.(7-2098)
 
Conclusion
 
Proposition 209's plainlanguage and Supreme Court precedent preventthe
 
initiative firom constituting a con^rehensive ban ofall consideration o^^race and genderin
 
public sector enq)loyment. First,government actorsin California maybe ableto use race
 
and genderin certain limited instances,such asbusing and notification programs,without
 
violating Proposition 209. Second,the Supreme Court's precedents dictate that
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Proposition 209cannotbe applied constitutionallyin certain situations. Proposition 209
 
doesnot restrictfederal courtsfrom granting preferentialreliefwhen authorized to do so
 
bythe Constitution or Title Vn. Additionally,state courtshearing federal causes ofaction
 
cannotin^oselimits on necessaryfederafremedies.
 
The question most crucialtothe survivalofafSrmative actionin California is
 
whether public en^loyersmust waitfor plaintifrsto suethemfor viplations ofTitle Vn
 
beforeinq)lementing race or gender-based preferences. When a public errq)loyer has a
 
history ofenq)loyment discrimination,the answer should beno becauseProposition209
 
cannot be applied to obstruct conq)hance withfederallaw. However,Title VIIcan only
 
preemptProposition 209when aflBrmative action programscomport with Title YITs
 
purpose. Thus,ifafBrmative actionfor diversity purposesisnot consistent with Title VII,
 
it maylegitimatelyfall within Proposition 209'sprohibitions. Althou^Proposition 209
 
may significantly narrowthe scope ofaflBrmative action,it cannotforeclose necessary
 
reheffor violationsoffederallaw(7-2098).
 
HowProposition 209 deals with diversity and aflfect it mayhave on opportunity
 
for allin the economyis yetto be seen. Chapterthree deals with theissuesofthe
 
economy and the programsin placeto help theless advantageto compete. The effectthat
 
Proposition209hason educationfor minorities and womenisanalyzed and concludes
 
with a prediction onthe effectsProposition 209wiU have onthe Black population.
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CHAPTERTHREE
 
TheEconomy,IsThisEconoinic Aparthe^^
 
Ifthe y.S is mdeed becoming more globalin its approachto business
 
opportunities and economics,then perhapsit'spickihg up tl^eformer apartheid policiesof
 
South Africa.
 
Theoretically,Proposition209 attenq)tsto put everyone pn^qualfooting.
 
However,since most minority businesses are newerand smaller,they're often unableto
 
coiq>ete with larger con^anies. An exan^le ofhow alarge businessis ableto compete
 
better is asfollows: Large con^any"A"has manyprojectsforthe sametype ofservice.
 
Con:5)any"A"drawsup agreementswith supplierstO obtain suppliejsinlarge quantities,
 
thusreducing its unit cost on supplies and consequentlymaking die con:q)any more
 
corppethive byit's ^ear abilityto obtain its supplies atlower cost. lyiost often,projects
 
bygovernment are awarded to large contractors becausethey can affordto offerthe
 
lowest bid. Without i^ecific designationsfor using smaller firms,such asthose addressed
 
by minority business enterprise(MBE)programsthat werethe targetsofPropo^on209
 
legislation,filosefirmswillfailto win contracts—let alone ^onq)ete~withlarge
 
con:q)anies.(10-l)
 
'Tthihk Proposition209isreally about contracting,"sayslohi^ Hill,AfBrmative
 
Action Con^liance OfhcerforLosAngeles County, ''A significantin^edimentto greater
 
communitybusinessenterprise(CBE)participation isthe county'spractice ofu^g
 
agreementvendors,"he said in a reportto county supervisorsonthe utilization status of
 
CBE's. ''This precludes smallbusinessesthattend tobe prinaarily rcjinority^dwomen­
 ownedfrom coBc^eting,"he adds. (1-2)
 
Although LosAngeleshasthelargest number ofAfrican Americansin the state.
 
Blacksrankthird in population bothin LosAngelesand in the state—behind whitesand
 
Mspanics. In a review ofLosAngeles County's contracting efforts,ofthe $1.4 billion in
 
contracts paid in fiscal year 1996-97,only6.3%(or$93 million)wentto CBEfirms. The
 
county'sfourlargest departments;Health services,public social services,public works,
 
andthe dieiiffs department—spent only3%oftheir$100 million in contracts with CBE
 
firms.The county's officialgoalisto award25%ofconstruction commodities and service
 
contractsto CBE conq)anies. Priorto Proposition 209,the state had an officialgoalof
 
15%speciftcallyfor minorities. (1-2)
 
"The difficultyisthatthere isless detailed information kept,and it variesbytown
 
and county,whatis actually going on with these programs,"says Conrad. "Whatcomes
 
outisthatthere have been goals set which are almost neverreached,particularlyfor
 
minority-owned firms,"she adds.
 
It'sthiskind ofatmospherethat Craig Jackson,President and CEO ofSaunders
 
Engineering,a 28-year-old Yorba Linda,California-based conq)any,fears. "Wehave not
 
gotten a statejob since Proposition 209waspassed. Although w^can bid anyjob we
 
want,thenumber ofcontractshasvirtually dried up,"says Jackson ofhis$40 million
 
concern. He'snot surefor which the tragedyis greater—a 28-year-old firm or a new one.
 
"Wecould nothave continuedthe growth pattem the con^anyhashad without it.
 
MinorityBusinessEnterprises(MBE)and Disadvantaged BusinessEnterprises(DBE)
 
goals. DBEallowed usto beintroducedto cHents. It wasthis vehicle that gotusin the
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doorin the first place. Nowthe pendulum hasswung the other way,"states Jackson.
 
That's precisely what afiBrmative action goalprogramswere[designed to create—
 
opportunity. "So httle ofbusinessis set-asides,"says Harriet Michel,President ofthe
 
National Minority SuppherDevelopment Councilin New York. "Se^-asides suggestthat
 
there are special dollars put awayfor blacks,whetherthey're qualified or not. Butthat's
 
nottrue. They still haveto meetthe qualifications. There's still conqiietition eventhough
 
it maybetargeted to minority suppliers,"she explains. (1-2)
 
Jackson,a 1997graduate ofthe SmallBusiness Administration's 8(a)program,
 
says only45%ofhis busiuess at anytime was8(a),butthe balance wasDBE. Withthe
 
Supreme Court also upholding the"Adarand decision,"President CJlinton and the SBA
 
have dispensed with theDBEcategory,a moveto"mend,not end"afiBrmative action
 
efiforts. Butthat doesn't mean all smallbusinesses wDlbe ableto compete,even firmsthe
 
size ofJackson's.(10-2)
 
"Sincethere isno SDBE(SmallDisadvantaged BusinessEnterprises)category,
 
you're either 8(a)or smallbusiness. Butthe kind ofcompaniesFm conpeting against are
 
$500 miUion mid above,so what's$40 million?"Jackson says,"Wedonthavethe same
 
kind ofresources. IfIwere a larger firm,Icould afford to absorb the loss and go onto
 
something else—that'sthe difference,"explains Jackson,whose companynow
 
enconpassesgeneral contracting. (1-2)
 
With ofiBcesin Califomia,Virginia,Hawaii,and Georgia,most ofJackson's
 
businessis with the federalgovernment on major municipal contracts. State or
 
local-sponsored projects makeup only a smallportion ofhis contracts. Thefirm currently
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has a $300,000 subcontract vsdth the UCsystemto rehabihtate a building on its San
 
Bernardino canq)us.(1-3)
 
Boston says Jackson's experience isvery consistent with that ofotherlarge,
 
minority-owned firms doing substantialbusiness with government entities. 'It's really,the
 
bigger firmswJiich are generating the mostjobsandthe mostrevenue,sothese arethe
 
firmsthat havethiskind ofd^endency,particularly onthe pubhc sector,becausethe
 
private sector continuesto lockthem out. It's also goingto be more concentrated in
 
particular areas,construction firmsare goingto be hit particularly hard,"notesBoston.
 
In November,votersin Houstontookthe first step in heedipg Boston's callto
 
action byvoting54%to46%to let affirmative action practicesremain byvoting down
 
Proposition"A",says Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee(D-Texas);"It gaveusa
 
chanceto explain vliat affirmative action actually meant"(1-2)
 
Jackson-Lee saysthe keyin Houston wasthe wording ofthe actualballot measure.
 
Ratherthan being asked wlietherthey wanted to ban"preferentialtreatment,"aswasthe
 
casein California,Houston voterswere asked specificallyifthey wished to ban affirmative
 
actionin city contracting and hiring. "We worked veryhard onthe wording to minimize
 
confusion,"she says. "It was clear that this measure would end affirmative action,and we
 
werenot going to stand forthatin Houston."
 
Indeed,Houston hasgone againstthetide ofanti-affirmative aqtion rhetoric in
 
recent years. MayorBob Lanier signed an executive orderin 1995 thatincreased the city's
 
affirmative action goals dramatically. Yet,one ofthe concemswasthe apparentlack Ofa
 
national effort or movementto stemthetide against affirmative action measures. "My
 
39
 
 i]iq>ression isliiat the organizational activity isnothappening in the black community,"
 
says Conrad.(14-1)
 
Beyond California,ifafiBrmative action is eliminated,it would likely have multiple
 
effects on public en:q)loyment,suggests Conrad. "Weknowfrom studies on a national
 
levelthatfor black womenin particular,pubhc enploymenthasbeen aforumfor upward
 
mobihty. ffyoulook atthe share ofmanagementand professionalworkersamong black
 
women who are enq)loyed in the public arena,it's veryhi^."'Wedon'treallyknowhow
 
manyblack businesses are dependent uponlocalgovernment contracts andhow many
 
have obtainedthem asa direct result ofafiBrmative action,"says Swinton. "Butif(federal
 
legislation passes)it is a significant share,then we're goingto see a significant intact."
 
(1-3) ,
 
One ofthe early and unexpected consequencesofProposition 209hasbeen its
 
intact on institutions ofhigherlearning in California. Whilethe effects on employment
 
and contracting remainto be seen,it doesn't appear wellforthe fiiture.
 
TheFuture;A Dream Deferred
 
Fornearly aslong ashe could remember,it had been Eric BUr(on's dreamto
 
attend law schoolat UC-Berkeley. And untilrecently,he had been at paceto dojust that.
 
With anLSAT score of160 out ofa possible 180,Burton wasaccepted to Berkeley's
 
BoaltLaw Schoollast March. It seemed asifyears ofhard work and preparation were
 
aboutto pay off That's whenthe controversy surroimding Proposition 209fell squarely
 
in Burton's path. "That wasthe schoolIwantedto getinto for such along time,"saysthe
 
native ofOxnard,California. 'It wasmytop choice and mydream school. Iwentto
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 undergraduate school at Stanford and with the expense ofthat,Inot only wanted to goto
 
a state schoolbecauseIthought it would beless e?q)ensive,but alsp becauseIthou^t
 
Berkeley wasa great school."(1-1)
 
ButBurton'stiming wasseriously off. In a foretelling ofProposition 209,the
 
California Board ofRegentshad recently passed Resolution SP-1,which ended afBrmative
 
actionin admissionsinthe UCsystem. Proposition209reinforcesthe aflSrmatrve action
 
ban onthe entireUCsystem as wellas other educational outlets such ascommunity
 
colleges. "What SP-1 does,is saythat you can nolonger use race as criteria,"says
 
Comad. "You still have thistwofold admissions process,onep^based on numerical
 
criteria and the other based on broader criteria,but race cannolongerbe a part ofthat
 
equation. The question is,what wiUtheittphcations be? (1-3)
 
The answer wasnotlong in coming. Burtonturned outto be one ofjust 18,
 
AMcan American students accepted to Berkeley'sLaw Schoolin 1997. Thiswasdown
 
from77blacks accepted in 1996. Burton says his decision wasfiirthpr complicated after
 
visiting the cartpus during"admit day,"when allthe potentialregistrants are invited to
 
tourthe canpus. Iwasthe only blackthere and had really strange yibes. There were
 
signs and placards saying,'Welcometo Jim CrowLaw School"and pinata looking like
 
Pete Wilson. Burton said,"most ofthe students andfaculty he sppke with were
 
supportive and concemed abouttheinpactProposition209would have on diversity at
 
Boalt." The dean said,"he wasalso concemed aboutthe numbersbut,was quickto add
 
thatin this era ofconservatismtheyhad to comply with the regents decision and
 
Proposition 209."(1-3)
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Bwton,who had also been accepted to UCLA,Stanford,Georgetown,The
 
University ofPennsylvania,and NewYork University,sayshe"agonized overthe decision
 
for a couple ofmonths." There existsa lot ofpressure and stress anyway,the first
 
semester oflaw schoolis difficult enough and thento have allthis media attention. Ijust
 
don'tthink it would have been goodfor me andIwasn'tup tothe fight. Ultimately,
 
Burton registered atUCLA AA^iere he's studying public interestl^w and policy.(1-3)
 
Justhow manyAfiican American students willultimately be affected by
 
Proposition209in California is difficult to determine. While it's apparent,thenumber of
 
blacksbeing accepted to Berkeleyhas declined dramatically. Blacksfind this difficultto
 
grasp and thus state,"We dontthink California is a fiiendly environrnent anymore,so we
 
mayhaveto relocate,"(l-3). Thetable on page53reflectsthe Black and Latino student
 
drop.
 
Twistii^g Back The Oock
 
CaHfbmia en^loys 191,425 state workers. Whitesaccountfor 110,066(or57.5%
 
ofthetotal)and Afiican Americansrepresent 22,025(or 11.5%). Forthe moment,
 
eirq)loyment policies and practiceshave not been inq)acted bythe an|;i-aflBrmative action
 
movement. Based on 1990U.S. Censusdata,Afiican Americasage25 and over
 
represented 5.7%ofthe state laborforce and 11%ofUC's workforce.(1-3)
 
TheUCsystem is one ofthelargest en:q)loyersin the state. Itsnine caucusesand
 
other sites accountfor 72,637 staffemqployees and 14,700 academic ei^loyees,ofwhich
 
6,900 arefaculty. Carmen Estrada,Director ofEqualOpportunity and Enq)loyee Support
 
ProgramsfortheUC Office ofthePresident,citesthe yearly payroll at$3 bilhon. The
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1997-98 annualbudgetis$8.7bMon,ofwhich $2.1 billion are statefunds.(1-3)
 
EmploymentofAfrican Americans,as a whole,decreased slightly by0.5%
 
statewide. Each campus sets aflSrmative action goalsbased on qualified personsin the
 
laborforce and notonthe generalpopulation at large. Amongthe 319UCsenior
 
managersearning over$100,000,14% are minority. Blacksrepresent5%,Asians
 
represent4.4%and Hispanicsrepresent4.7%. Estrada saysthistqUy doesnotinclude
 
otherjob categories with similar salary scales,such asfaculty, deans,physicians,and
 
coaches. (1-3)
 
LaRhondaLoeb,Manager ofRecruitment and Enq)loyee Relationsfor L.A.Care
 
Health Plan,agrees with Estrada. "Diversity isthe only approachfor good business. It
 
meansrecognizing and understanding that differencesamong people exist,and it's all
 
right,"she says. "Bycreating an environment ofacceptance,conq)any enq)loyees can
 
worktoward a common goal" Loeb,whose concernis a nonprofit oyerseer ofmanaged
 
care health plansto Medi-Calbeneficiaries,saysthe organization is"dynamically diverse."
 
She estimatesAfrican Americans and other ethnic minoritiesrepresenj:40%oftop
 
managerialpositions. "Wehave a wayto go,but our goalisto mirrorthe population that
 
we serve fromtop to bottom."(1-3)
 
Inthelong run,Loeb predictsProposition 209 will affectthe ^ersity ofthe
 
workforce and how people applyforjobs. Other potentialproblemsthat could arise are a
 
reduction in worlq)lace productmty,low morale,increased discriniination,and poor
 
decision-making by supervisors and managers.(1-4)
 
Priorto entering the private sectorin 1996,Loeb worked asa civilian enq)loyee
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forthe federalgovenrmentfor 12years. She recalls getting herfirstjob in 1984 as a result
 
ofafBrmative action. The U.S.Navyrecruited top honor students at Lincoln High School
 
in San Diego,for a specialsunnner work program. "Byeliminating afBrmative action,"
 
^e says,"it only sends a negative messagethat we're turning back the clock."(1-3)
 
ModestIncome Gains
 
Brimmer,President ofBriimner&Co.,an economic analysisfirmin Washington,
 
D.C.,predicts blackincometo top $450 billion in'98. The growth rate forthe American
 
economy willslow noticeablythrou^the year ahead,and the une]|nployment rate will
 
remain level. "When welook at 1998,the growth rate ofthe economywiU moderate
 
somevriiat,"saysBrimmer,aformer memberofthe FederalReserve Board. 'Tt will
 
converge moretoward itslong-run potentialgrowth rate,whichIestimate willbe between
 
2%and 2.75%.Idon't see any major shocks onthe horizon and anythingto disturb the
 
forecast. Sothe realeconomyislikelyto e?q)and moderately,inflation to remain subdued
 
and en^loymentto increase." (1-3)
 
The housing sector wasa significant source ofstrength forthe economyin 1996.
 
The quickened pace ofactivity wassupported bylower mortgage interest rates and again
 
last yearin disposableincome. Despite somewhathigher mortgage ratesin 1998,thelevel
 
ofhousing starts will most likely continueto rise. The slight easing ofratesin 1996 gave
 
a boostto housing starts last year. Brimmerforecaststhat mortgage rate onnew homes
 
mayrisethisyear fi-om 7.79%to 8.01 %.(1-3)
 
He also projected thatthe 1997blacklaborforce would expand to 15.6 million,or
 
11%ofthe total workforce. Black eirqployment would rise to 14.1 million,or 10.9%of
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thetotal 130 million en^loyed. Black unenq)loyment,he predicted,would average9.3%,
 
or 1.4 million,vs.4.4%for whitesand 5.1%forthe total civilian laborforce. The
 
economist doesnote some disturbing trendsthat wiUintactAMcan American statusin
 
the years ahead. Inthe short run,he predictsno major changesin thelaborforce. The
 
continued ejq)ansion ofthe U.S.economyin 1998 wiU enable blacksto makefiirther
 
moderate gainsin their economic position. But,he cautions,blackshaye shared lessin the
 
economic expansion ofthe countrythan other races because ofthe growing segment of
 
incarcerated blacks. "Thathasa substantialimpact onthe potentiallabor supply.
 
Increasingly,blackswhom you expectto show up inthe laborforce don't getthere,"notes
 
Brimmer. "Thatresultsin a lossofjobsandincome,which isgomgto be a very big area
 
ofconflict and costto society."(1-3)
 
Asother ethnic populationsgrow.Brimmer predictsthat blacks mayend up onthe
 
short end. "Wesee whiteslosing ^ ares,butthe gains are being enjoyed primarily by
 
Asians and to a lesser extent Hispanics,warnBrimmer Downthe road,as concpetition
 
increases,it willnotbe BlacksversusWhites,its goingto be Blacksversuseverybody
 
else,unless conditions change dramatically werisk dropping out atthe bottom." Thisis
 
further demonstrated bythe depiction on table,"MoneyIncomebyRace",on page 52.
 
(1-3)
 
Conclusion
 
Today,afl:er a generation ofprogress,Americans'commitmentto equal
 
opportunity,not onlyfor AfiicMi Americans,butfor other minority^oups,andfor
 
women are at a crossroads. A wellfinanced,politically powerfiil movement dedicated to
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ending afBrmative action hasmade significant gains. Although itsleaders claimthey
 
support equalopportunity,they have,in feet,hnmched an,all out attack on one ofthe
 
fairest, most eflFective toolsfor ending discrimination. Their attack is based ontwo
 
demonstrablyfelse premises:that afBrmative action isno longer needed,and that it isin all
 
itsformsunfair.
 
AfBrmative action opponentssaythat it's no longer needed because discrimination
 
is athing ofthe past. But while it istrue that much progresshasbeen made sincethe
 
enactmentofthe CivilRightsAct of1964 and other civil right?legislation,it is also true
 
thattheselawshavenot been selfexecuting,nor did they change centuriesof
 
discriminatory habits,customsand attitudes. Asa result many avenuesofopportunity
 
haveremained narrow and constricted, available onlytothe relativelyfew. The evidence
 
clearly provesthatthe playing field isn't level yet:
 
1. A majority ofwhite Americans stiU believe that African and Latino Americans,
 
are lessintelhgent,working less,and are less patriotic than whites.
 
2. Governmentpublic education spending is clearlylinked to race. Schools
 
serving mostly minority,inner city children receive about one-halfthe money
 
per studentthat schoolsin surrounding white suburbsreceive.
 
3. In 1990,the average black male worker earned $731 for every$1000earned by
 
a white male worker. Latino men earned $810for every$1,000 earned by
 
similarly educated white men.
 
4.Although white males make up only43%ofthe workforce,they occupy97%
 
ofthetop executive positions at America's 1,500largest corporations.
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Thelargest group ofAmericansto benefitfiom afiBrmative action thusfar is
 
women. Before 1964,women were excluded frommanyhigher paying occupationsand
 
professions based on stereotype,custom and law. There areno women'spolice ofi&cers,
 
truck drivers,or pilots,and women'slawyersand doctors wefe rare. But despite
 
progress,manybarriersto fiill equahtyremain:
 
1. Men are still99%ofaU auto mechanics and carpenters;98%ofaU firefi^ters;
 
97%ofall pilots, and95%ofall welders.
 
2. Overall,American women eam only72%ofvriiat men makefor cortq)arable
 
work.
 
3. Women hold only3-5%ofsenior positionsinthe privatg sector.
 
Opponentsclaim afiBrmative action forcesemployersto"give preference"to less
 
qualified minorities. Equating afiBrmative action with quotas,they argue that color-blind
 
laws are fairerthan thosethattake race into account. But afiBrmative action isnot a quota
 
system or aform ofreverse discrimination. Nor doesit give preferentialtreatmentto
 
unqualified minorities and women.
 
Quotashave alwaysbeen used as a method ofexclusion,notinclusion. Before the
 
CivilRightsAct,quotas were usedto keep out qualified membersofunpopular racial or
 
rehgiousgroups. Thatis whythey are intensely disliked bythe pubhc and have been
 
strongly disfavored bythe Supreme Court.
 
Goalsand timetablesfound in afiBrmative action plans are notthe samething as
 
quotas. They are a nondiscriminatory wayofmaking sure thatthose who were previously
 
excluded are finally broughtinto the workplace,and a wayofmeasuring whether
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discrimination is being reduced. Withoutthem,enqjloyers with a history ofdiscriminatory
 
practices would continue"bui^essasusual." Withthem,en^loyers must make effortsto
 
recruit and hire qualified women and/or minoritiesfor vacant positionsfrom whichthey
 
were previously excluded. Ihisisthe opposite ofdiscrittunation.
 
Enq)loyers and universitieshave always engaged informsof "preferential
 
treatment." It wasonly when race and gender became afactor inthe effortto end
 
discrimination that preferencesbecame a problem Yetthere are manyexamplesoflong
 
accepted preferentialtreatment. University preference ofveterans oyer non-veterans,or
 
children ofalumniover other youthsis one exanq)le;en^loyers hiring the sonsand
 
daughtersoftheir economic and social equalsisanother.
 
Requiring that qualified minorities and women be actively recruited and,whenever
 
appropriate,hired. Thatisthe only waypreviously excluded minorities and women can
 
gain a toehold in cottq)anies, occupations,and schoolsthat were previouslyreserved for
 
white me«|i. It'sfeimessitself
 
Although anti-civil rights advocatescon^lain of"reverse disjcrimination,"infeet
 
only 1.7% ofallrace-based chargesfiled withthe equalEn^loyment Opportunity
 
Commission have been filed by white males. Thisis because the Suppme Courthas
 
already ruled thatthe interests ofwhiteincumbentsmustbe protected. When a company
 
with a history ofpast discrimination passes over a white man and hires a quahfied minority
 
or womeninstead,that isn't"reverse discrimination."
 
The most dishonest claim madeby afBrmative action's opponentsisthat since the
 
U.S.^ould be a color bhnd society,civil rightsremediesthattake raceinto accoimt are
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perpetuating discrimination. Reaching a color blind societyrequires being conscious
 
about color. There is,unfortunately,abundant proofthatthe U.S.is npt yet a color blind
 
society. Attitudinal studies show that stereotypes are pervasive. In one,53%ofthe white
 
surveyed respondentsjudged BlackslessinteUigentthan Whites,and62%though Blacks
 
were'less hard working." These sometimes,unconscious stereotypeshave anintacton
 
Black opportunitiesinthe real world. Studiesshow tiiat negative stereotypes about
 
women persist as well. They are still believed to havelessleadership abilitythan mai.
 
Thelaw ofaflSrmative action hasbeen evolving since the C|vilRightsAct was
 
passed in 1964. AfSrmatrve action plans are sometimescourt mposed and othertimes
 
tbey are adopted on a voluntary basis. To belegal,these plans sho^lld:
 
•	 Beflexible,preferablyusing amendable goalsand timetablesto increase
 
minority andfemale participation,ratherthan rigid nui^erical quotas.
 
•	 Generallynotinterfere with thelegitimate seniority expectationsofcurrent
 
employees.
 
•	 Betenq)orary,lasting nolongerthap necessaryto remedythe
 
discrimination.
 
SomeAmerican businesseshavehad aflBrmative action pro^amsin:q)osed upon
 
them by courts,but manymorehave adoptedthem voluntarilyfortwo main reasons.
 
First, vriiite males make up a minority ofthe American workforce,so firmsthatfavor
 
white men wQlfind themselvesfishing in a shirking poolofpotential en(q)loyees. Second,
 
a diverse workforce creates a con^etitrve corporate edge with consumersofdififerent
 
races and backgrounds. It isn't surprising that amongthe many organizationsthat
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opposed the 1996 public referendumto end aflBrmatrve actionin California werethe
 
California BusinessRoimdtables,the San Francisco Chamber ofCommerce and the Los
 
AngelesBusinessAlliance.
 
In 1964,the yearthe CivilRightsAct waspassed,only4%ofAMcan Americans
 
25 years or older had con^letedfour yearsofcollege,compared to 10%ofwhitesinthe
 
same age group. By 1993,thefigurefor blackshad gone up to 12%. Thisis because
 
during that 29-year period,the university communityhad taken afiSrmative stepsto recruit
 
and admit more minorities.
 
Although affirmative action in education cameunder earlylegal attack,its
 
constitutionality wasupheld bythe Supreme Courtin 1974in the case ofUniversity of
 
California v. Baklce. In Bakke,the court ruled that while,"racial and ethnic distinctions
 
ofany sort are inherently suspect,"a university could take race e?q)hcitly into account
 
under a^ppropriate circumstances.
 
Anti-civilrights pundits argue against affirmative action onthe groimdsthat it
 
"stigmatizes"Afiican Americans and other minority student who are assumed to be
 
incon^etent becausethey were admitted based on color,noton mer^t. This argumentis
 
absurd and distortsthe way affirmative action works.
 
Harvard College,an affirmative action pioneer,w4iose policyhasbeen emiilated
 
throu^outthe countryworksthis way: after admitting the most qualified applicants,the
 
admissions committeelooks atthatlarge middle group ofapplicants v^ho are admissible
 
and beheved to be capable ofdoing good work. In evaluating each applicant,race maytip
 
the balancein his or herfavor,just ascoming from a particular geographic region might.
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Race can be a plus,but onlyifthe applicant possessesthe qualificationsfor admission.
 
Althoughthe percentage ofAfrican-American college graduateshasincreased
 
from4%to 12%i^ce 1964,the percentage ofwhite college graduateshasgonefrom
 
10%to23%. Thispersistent gap tellsusthat aflBrmative action ia higfier education is still
 
needed. SeeUCchart on page 53.
 
Ultimately,wehave along wayto go before we see a cortq)let€!color blind society.
 
In orderto achieve this goal,the Nation asa whole wiUhaveto seethe need and the
 
in^ortanceto treat allraces equally. Ifwefeilin this effort,the Natiop willbethe greater
 
looser and it willgothe waythat other Nationshave gone whohave not considered the
 
need to provide equal opportunityfor all withthe same merits. A good exan^le ofthisis
 
whathappenedin South Afiica. The upraising whichtook place wasthe onlywayleftfor
 
the Black Africansinthat countryto be noticed and given an opportunity. Isthisviatwe
 
wantto happen in thisNation?
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MoneyIncome byRace(in billions ofdollars)
 
1995 1996 
Category Amount %ofTotal Amount % ofTotal 
Allhouseholds $4,477.8 100.00 $4,760,3 100.00 
White 3,949.1 88.21 4,167.4 87.54 
Black 351.9 7.86 393.1 8.26 
Other races 176.0 3.93 199.8 4.20 
1997 1998
 
Category Amount %ofTotal Amount % ofTotal
 
Allhouseholds $5,030.7 100.00 $5,272.2 100.00
 
White 4,381.7 87.10 572.6 86.73
 
Black 25.1 8.45 454.4 8.62
 
Other races 223.9 4.45 245.2 4.65
 
Calculationsby Brimmer&Co.Inc. Datafor 1995 fromthe U.S. CensusBureau.
 
Estimatesfor 1996through 1998byBrimmer&Co.
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UC's
 
President ran a simulation onhowmany graduate students would have entered in 1994
 
using the mandate ofproposition 209.
 
Category
 
Afiican American
 
American Indian
 
Asian
 
Chicano/Latino
 
Fihpino
 
White/other
 
TOTAL
 
. Actual
 
Enrollment
 
Fall 1994
 
309
 
89
 
2,289
 
1,146
 
261
 
3,876
 
7,970
 
Simulated
 
Enrollment
 
178
 
'51"
 
2,740
 
999
 
272
 
3,991
 
8,229
 
%ofTotal
 
Freshman
 
Category Changein% Enrollment
 
African American 
.
 
American Indian
 
Asian
 
Chicano/LathiO
 
Fihpino
 
White/Other
 
-42.4­ 3.9 
-43.3 1.1 
19.7 28.7 
-12.9 ■ 14.4 
4.0 3.3 
3.0 48.6 
Change
 
-131
 
-39
 
451
 
-14
 
11
 
115
 
Simulated%
 
ofFreshman
 
Enrollment
 
2.2
 
0.6
 
. 33.3
 
12.1
 
3.3
 
48.5
 
Source: University ofCahforma,Oflhce ofthe Presi
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